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School Systems and Efficiency and Equity of Education 
 
 
How students should be allocated to schools to achieve educational goals is one of 
important debates on the construction of school systems. Promoters of comprehensive 
and selective school systems fail to reach a consensus on implications of each system for 
efficiency and equity of education. This paper examines impacts of different systems of 
student allocation on educational goals, using a simple economic model. It argues that 
how a selective system is designed matters a great deal in a comparison between 
comprehensive and selective systems: different designs of a selective system can yield 
widely different educational implications compared with those from a comprehensive 
system. A judicious use of a selective system can at times achieve educational goals better 
than a comprehensive system. Given our finding that different households prefer different 
school systems, we suggest that by offering multiple subsystems, the educational planner 
can enhance educational attainments of households beyond those achieved by a single 
national system. 
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How students should be allocated to schools to achieve educational goals is one of 
important debates on the construction of school systems during the past few decades. 
Historically, many West European and Scandinavian countries transformed their 
secondary school system from a selective to a comprehensive system during the 1960s 
and 1970s. Contemporaneously, some countries such as Germany and Singapore adopt a 
selective system based on entrance examinations to allocate students to secondary 
schools; other countries such as U.S., U.K. and South Korea employ a comprehensive 
system based on residential school districts to achieve the same goal. 
Although a school system adopts either comprehensive, selective, or a combination 
of both methods at different levels of education (e.g., Japan) as a primary method of 
student allocation, there exists little agreement about the ultimate desirability of either 
system in education. Proponents of comprehensive systems argue that the major 
objective of a school system is to provide equal educational opportunities to all students 
irrespective of family and social backgrounds. They contend that by giving students 
rights to attend any school in the neighborhood, education can serve as a method for 
narrowing educational inequality between different income groups and correcting social 
segregation via intergenerational educational mobility (Jenkins et al., forthcoming; 
Leschinsky and Mayer, 1990; Oakes, 1985). They also believe that a comprehensive 
system performs better in terms of efficiency of educational production, because peer 
group effects in school benefit weak students but do not hurt strong students (Kang et al., 
forthcoming; Kerckhoff, 1986).   2
On the other hand, advocates of selective systems argue that a selective school 
maximizes educational outcomes because it is easier for teachers to instruct groups of 
students with a low variance of ability and for students to learn more with similar-ability 
students in school (Fernandez and Gali, 1999; Gamoran and Mare, 1989; Slavin, 1990). 
They also believe that a selective system is more fair since student allocation is based 
upon ability alone, not upon family background. It is often the case under a 
comprehensive system that family incomes play an important role in student allocation 
to schools, because the levels of school and peer quality of a student are determined by 
the residential location and are reflected in house prices in the school district (Black, 
1999; Gibbons and Machin, 2003). In addition, as usually observed in East Asian 
countries such as South Korea and Japan, the lack of school choice within the district 
gives rise to a large scale market for private tutoring (Kim and Lee, 2001). Private 
tutoring may function to transmit current inequality of family income to the next 
generation. 
Disagreements about school systems do not remain at the theoretical level alone, but 
empirical studies also report conflicting findings about effects of school systems on 
efficiency and equity of education. Some studies (e.g., Bauer and Riphahn, 2006; 
Dustmann, 2004; Meghir and Palme, 2005; Pekkarinen et al., 2006; Shuetz et al., 2005) 
find that a selective (comprehensive) system reinforces (weakens) the impact of family 
background on educational outcomes, while others (e.g., Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles, 
2005) report effects of school systems in the opposite direction. Studies also show 
varying findings about inequality of educational outcomes under different school 
systems. Gorard and Smith (2004) and Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) find that a 
selective system exacerbates the inequality in educational outcomes. In contrast, Figlio 
and Page (2002) show ability tracking reduces the inequality of academic performance. 
Moreover, rare empirical studies on the impact of school systems on the level of 
educational outcomes also report inconclusive evidence regarding test scores and 
adulthood earnings (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2006; Kang et al. , forthcoming). 
Given such conflicting views and empirical findings on school systems, this paper 
attempts to shed light on how differently many educational objectives are affected by 
different school designs and how sometimes conflicting empirical findings about effects 
of school systems can be reconciled. First, we set up a simple economic model for a 
household's choice about consumption and educational investments for a child, and find 
the optimal decisions under different school systems. Each school system is 
characterized by the role of a student's ability and the parent's choice of residential 
district and educational spending in the determination of quality of school peers. We   3
then compare the optimal choices and their impacts on efficiency and equity of 
educational outcomes across different school systems. In the comparison, we employ as 
criteria educational expenditures, the role of family income and student ability in the 
determination of the educational outcome, and the variance and level of the outcome. 
Looking at differences in such variables across different school systems, we examine 
what implications each school system has for efficiency and equity of education. Such a 
comparison will inform educational policymakers of the strengths and weaknesses of 
different school systems in achieving educational goals. 
Our theory of school systems gives rise to several points that fail to emerge in 
previous debates on school systems. Above all, it suggests that how a selective system is 
designed matters a great deal in a comparison between comprehensive and selective 
systems. Provided that a selective system is based on an entrance exam to assign 
students to schools, whether the exam signals a student's innate ability or ability affected 
by parents' educational spending (prior to the exam) yields different educational 
implications. For example, unlike the conventional belief, the effect of family income 
on educational outcomes can be weaker in a selective system than in a comprehensive 
system, if the former is based on an entrance exam biased toward innate ability (e.g., an 
IQ test). In addition, an entrance exam in a selective system may be designed in a way 
that it yields lower inequality in educational attainment than a comprehensive system 
offers. A judicious use of a selective system can at times achieve educational goals 
better than a comprehensive system does. 
We also find that different households that are characterized by family income and 
the child's innate ability prefer different school systems; which household prefers which 
system depends on a design of the entrance exam in the selective system. Thus by 
offering multiple subsystems within a national school system (e.g., a comprehensive 
system in one region and a selective system in the other) and giving households a choice, 
the educational planner can enhance overall educational attainments beyond those that 
can be achieved by a single national system. We show this in our theory and in a 
simulation analysis.   
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses related literatures, and 
Section 3 introduces a basic model of a household's choice under student rationing 
systems---comprehensive and selective systems. In section 4, we discuss analytical 
results from the two systems in terms of efficiency and equity of education. Section 5 
introduces a third school system---a market system where students are allocated through 
school markets. We compare outcomes of a market system with those of the rationing 
systems. In Section 6 we propose a school system with comprehensive and selective   4
allocations as subsystems, and examine its relative performance by means of a 
simulation. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related Literature 
 
While economic theories of school systems are relatively rare, the current paper is 
connected with the previous literature on economics of education in several ways. First, 
the most closely related are economic theories on peer effect and ability grouping in 
education. A selective schooling is closely related with ability grouping across schools; 
a comprehensive schooling with ability mixing across schools.
1 Benabou (1996) 
examines implications of ability grouping and mixing of students and workers for 
economic growth in the short-run and long-run. He argues that if the degree of 
complementarity of student abilities---negative externalities of weak students---in 
educational production is moderate, ability mixing tends to slow down the short-run 
growth but raise the long-run growth, since mixing homogenizes workers over time. 
However, even in the long run ability grouping may still be a better alternative, if 
complementarity in education is so strong that the cost of mixing in education exceeds 
the benefit of worker homogeneity. Lazear (2001) also investigates how educational 
outputs are affected by grouping methods of different-quality students in a classroom. 
He shows that the total educational output is maximized when students are grouped 
according to quality; yet he adds that ability mixing should be preferred if high-quality 
students can influence the output of low-quality students via peer interactions. 
Fernandez and Gali (1999) compare the relative performance of markets and 
tournaments---ability grouping by a test---in an economy with borrowing constraints. 
They show that tournaments dominate markets in terms of matching efficiency, and also 
in terms of aggregate consumption if tournaments are based on signaling technologies 
that are sufficiently responsive to ability variations relative to variations in expenditures. 
Although they shed light on implications of different school systems and ability 
grouping methods for efficiency and equity of education, such studies can be limited 
from the perspective of the construction of a school system. These studies generally 
draw educational outcomes of an alternative grouping method when a pool of students 
                                            
1 In this paper our primary concern is about how to allocate students across schools, not across classes 
within a school given that the students are already placed to the school. For issues and impacts of within-
school ability grouping and mixing on education, see, e.g., Argys et al. (1996), Betts and Shkolnik (2000), 
Figlio and Page (2002), Gamoran (1987), and Slavin (1990).   5
is exogenously given to be grouped across schools and classrooms. However, a pool of 
students to be grouped within a school may be subject to change when different 
grouping methods are adopted by different schools. For example, Epple et al. (2002) 
clearly show that sorting patterns of students between private and public schools vary 
according to whether public schools adopt ability tracking within school. There is a 
need for a theory of school systems to take parents' choices about grouping methods 
into account.   
In addition, theoretical discussions of ability grouping in education generally put a 
primary focus on the efficiency aspect of educational production, and examine which 
method of student organization (i.e., ability grouping/tracking/streaming versus ability 
mixing/heterogeneous grouping) maximizes educational outcomes (e.g., Fernandez and 
Gali, 1999). In contrast, a rationale behind the introduction of a comprehensive 
schooling in Western Europe and several other countries has been to achieve an equal 
opportunity of education and cure social inequality mediated through education across 
generations (Leschinsky and Mayer, 1990). Illuminating the equity aspect of different 
school systems will balance and enhance our understanding about impacts of a school 
system on a society. 
Second, there is believed to exist excessive private tutoring for primary and 
secondary school students in East Asian countries such as South Korea and Japan (Bray 
and Kwok, 2003). Parents and educational policymakers in these countries often call for 
a reform in the school system in a way that private tutoring is not required or at least 
reduced. The presence of excess private tutoring is at times explained by cultural factors 
such as a high educational motivation of parents in these countries (Bray, 1999, pp.69-
70), which is difficult to manipulate by means of a school reform. It is possible, 
however, that unique systems of student allocation in these countries are responsible for 
the presence of such excess tutoring. For instance, if an entrance exam in a selective 
system is designed in a way that it is sufficiently responsive to variation in students' 
endowed ability relative to that in parents' educational spending (prior to the exam) for 
the children, the parents spend more on private tutoring under a comprehensive system 
than under a selective system.
2 Relying on an economic theory of school systems, we 
                                            
2 A comparison of private tutoring patterns between South Korea and Japan is interesting in this respect, 
because both countries adopt a comprehensive system at the lower secondary level (i.e., middle school; 
grades 7 to 9), while South Korea employs a comprehensive system and Japan uses a selective system at 
the upper secondary level (i.e., high school; grades 10 to 12). In South Korea private tutoring is prevalent 
up to the upper secondary level; in Japan it is pronounced only up to the lower secondary level but   6
can understand better the relationship between a school system and the presence of 
excess private tutoring, and propose reform plans to reduce excessive tutoring. 
Third, residential sorting is often discussed in connection with education (Epple and 
Romano, 2003; Fernandez, 2001, Nechyba, 2006). Such discussions are generally made 
in the context of the U.S. school system that is characterized by a comprehensive 
system. There is a lack of relevant economic theories that concern sorting patterns of 
households under alternative school systems. It is potentially important for a school 
design and its reforms to understand how households will be sorted under different 
systems of student allocation. 
 
3. The model 
 
Now we present our model. Consider the following Cobb-Douglas utility and 
educational production function of a household that consists of a parent and one child; 
 
) (
γ β α α θ e b x A x u = =  where  1 α βγ + += ,  1 , , 0 < < γ β α  (1) 
 
where the household's total utility is given by the amount of private goods consumption 
( x) and the child's educational outcome ( A). The educational outcome is determined 
by the child's time-invariant innate ability (b ); the average quality of peers in school 
(θ ); and the amount of private education services (e), which is provided by private 
educational institutions or private tutoring in the market.
3 
The current Cobb-Douglas form of utility and educational productions plays an 
important role in drawing differences in educational implications across different school 
systems in this paper. The adoption of such a functional form is not unique to the 
current study. They are often employed by the economics of education literature (e.g., 
Epple et al., 2002; Epple and Romano, 1998; Ferreyra, forthcoming; Lazear, 2001; 
Nechyba, 2000). There is a trade-off between restrictiveness of the functions and the 
number of criteria that we can employ to assess different school systems. The more 
restrictive the functional forms are, the more dimensions (e.g., efficiency and equity) we 
can examine to evaluate the performance of school systems. For the current 
                                                                                                                                
relatively less widespread at the upper secondary level (Bray, 1999). In both countries, private tutoring is 
rare at the college level where student allocation is based on an exam-based selective system. 
3  To focus on choices on peers in school, we assume that every public school spends an equal amount of 
resources for a student.   7
comparisons that look into educational expenditures, the role of family income and 
student ability in the determination of the educational outcome, and the variance and 
level of the outcome, we believe that the Cobb-Douglas form of utility and educational 
productions serves better, not worse at least, to highlight differences in educational 
implications across different systems.
4 
Now we consider two major school designs that are based on rationing: 
comprehensive and selective school systems. In a comprehensive system, parents 
choose a school district based on residential location, and their children are placed 
randomly into one school within the school district
5; in a selective system, students take 
an entrance examination and are admitted to a school according to their ranking in the 
exam. (Later we consider a third system---a market system in which parents can 
purchase the quality of school peers at a given price.) 
Under a comprehensive system, the quality of school peers (θ ) is exogenously 
given to students once a school district is decided, hence parents can not choose the 
quality of peers in school directly. Within a district, students face the same average 
quality of peers in any school due to randomization. Nonetheless, parents can choose 
the quality of school peers indirectly by moving across school districts. The children's 
quality of a school district is priced through the housing market. Let us denote the 
children's average quality of a school district by  d  and its unit price by  d p . In the 
model, for simplicity, we assume that each school district has an identical living 
environment so that  d   is determined solely by the average quality of children residing 
in the district. We also suppose that there is no commuting cost of students between the 
                                            
4 In order to check the robustness of our results to different functional forms of utility and educational 
production, we experiment with two alternative functions in Appendix: (1) CES utility with a Cobb-
Douglas form of educational production; (2) Cobb-Douglas utility with a CES form of educational 
production. The first case produces the largely same results as those reported in the text; the second case 
fails to produce analytical forms of key outcome variables, which makes it difficult to compare 
educational implications across different school systems. 
5 Under comprehensive systems, there are largely two methods of student placement within a school 
district. The first is to assign each student randomly to one school within the district. This method has 
been employed in South Korea since 1969 to allocate students to middle schools and general (or non-
vocational) high schools within a school district. See OECD (1998, Chapters 1 and 2) for details. The 
second is to assign each student to one school within a district in consideration of the preferences of the 
student and parent. Such a method is more common in comprehensive systems than random assignment. 
In our analysis, however, we assume random assignment within a district for conceptual sharpness.   8
house and school.   
In contrast, under a selective system, the choice of a school district does not matter, 
because schools give admissions to students based on the entrance exam ranking alone, 
not on the school district. In this system parents choose the quality of school peers 
solely by raising the entrance exam ranking of the child. Under a selective system, the 
quality of school peers (θ ) is determined by a child's innate ability (b ) and the parent's 
educational investments ( f ) made prior to the exam to improve the ranking. Note that 
e denotes current educational investments that directly raise the current educational 
outcome ( A), while  f   concerns prior investments that directly improve the ranking of 
the entrance exam, but only indirectly related to the current outcome.  f   in a selective 
system corresponds to  d   in a comprehensive system in that the decision about them is 
made prior to attending school, although real time does not elapse. 
To characterize different systems of student allocation to schools, we introduce the 
following model for  θ : 
 
3 2 1 δ δ δ θ f d b =        ( 2 )  
 
A comprehensive system is characterized by  1 2 = δ  and  13 0 δ δ = = , and a selective 
system by  2 0 δ = ,  1 0 δ >  and  0 3 ≥ δ .  2 δ  is equal to one in a comprehensive system 
that employs within-district randomization, because θ , the average peer quality in a 
school, is ultimately determined by d , the average quality of children in a school 
district.
6 Instead of replacing it with one, we carry  2 δ  in subsequent analysis for 
richness of interpretations. For a selective system we allow  3 δ  to be equal to zero in 
order to invite an extreme design of the entrance exam. Not only can the educational 
planner choose between comprehensive and selective systems, but it can design a 
selective system by manipulating the relative levels of  1 δ  and  3 δ  in the entrance 
exam in a way that  b  matters more than  f  or vice versa. For example, an IQ test 
may be employed as the entrance exam, in which case  3 δ  is close to zero and  1 δ  
remains positive.
7 
                                            
6 If a within-district allocation of students is not random, then  2 δ   may deviate from one. 
7 Fernandez and Gali (1999) also consider different educational implications of different signaling 
technologies under a selective system. They show that if a signaling technology is sufficiently responsive 
to ability variation (i.e., relatively small  3 δ  and large  1 δ ), a selective system based on tournaments 
delivers higher aggregate educational output and aggregate consumption than a market system. We find 
similar results below.   9
 
4. A Household's Choice in Rationing Systems  
 
Under rationing systems of student allocation, a parent faces the following budget 
constraint: 
e p f p d p x y t e f d + + + = − ) 1 ( ,      (3) 
where  y  is the income level of a household;  )) 1 , 0 ( (∈ t  is an education tax rate 
charged to a household for an operation of public schools (∑ty  is used to run the 
entire public school system);  f p  is the price of  f ; and  e p  is the price of  e. The 
price of  x is assumed to be one for normalization. All the prices are exogenously 
determined in their own perfectly competitive markets. 
Under rationing systems, the optimal quantity of each type of consumption, 
educational outcome and indirect utility function can be obtained as follows.   
y t x ) 1 (
) ( 3 2
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We below denote the outcomes of a comprehensive system by subscript  c  and those of 
a selective system by subscript  s. 
   10
 
Proposition 1: (Choice of Consumption and Educational Expenditures) The optimal 
choices on consumption goods (x), and expenditures on the quality of a school district 
(
* d pd ), prior educational services (
* f p f ) and current educational services (
* e pe ) 
under the two systems are ranked as follows: 
(i)  If  23 δ δ > , then 
* *
s c x x < , 
* *
s e c e e p e p < , 
* *
s f c d f p d p >  and 
* * * *
s e s f c d c e e p f p d p e p + > + .  
(ii)  If  3 2 δ δ ≤ , then
* *
s c x x ≥ , 
* *
s e c e e p e p ≥ , 
* *
s f c d f p d p ≤  and 
* * * *
s e s f c d c e e p f p d p e p + ≤ + . 
Proof: Assign values of  1 δ ,  2 δ  and  3 δ  that characterize comprehensive and 
selective systems, respectively. Then, the propositions are trivial from the comparison of 
(4), (5), (6) and (7). QED 
 
Proposition 1 implies that the levels of a household's consumption and education-
related spending vary between comprehensive and selective systems. Such levels do not 
vary between the two systems alone, they also change within a selective system with 
values of  3 δ  relative  to  2 δ . If  3 δ   is set less than  2 δ , for instance, the entrance exam 
in a selective system is relatively weakly responsive to variations in parents' spending 
prior to the exam. In such a case, households spend less on education and consume 
more in a selective system than in a comprehensive system. If  3 δ  is set sufficiently 
large, however, the rankings are reversed: by investing in the entrance exam ( f ) rather 
than purchasing a school district (d ), parents attempt to manipulate the quality of 
school peers of the child, spending more on education and consuming less in a selective 
system than in a comprehensive system. 
 
Proposition 2: (Elasticities of  A) 







) is greater in 
a selective system than in a comprehensive system. 
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. Assign values of 
1 δ ,  2 δ  and  3 δ  that characterize each system, respectively. Then, the propositions are 
trivial from the comparisons. QED 
 
Like the conventional belief, a student's ability has a stronger influence on the 
educational outcome in a selective system than in a comprehensive system (see, e.g., 
Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2005) for empirical evidence). Unlike the conventional 
belief, however, the relative strength of the effect of family background on the 
educational outcome depends on the design of a selective system. If  3 δ  is larger than 
2 δ , i.e., the entrance exam in a selective system is strongly responsive to parents' 
spending before the exam, the effect of family income is greater in a selective system 
than in a comprehensive system. In such a case, rich parents in a selective system invest 
heavily to equip the children for the entrance exam. It strengthens the effect of family 
income in a selective system relative to that in a comprehensive system. If  3 δ  is less 
than  2 δ , however, the role of family income is smaller in a selective system than in a 
comprehensive system, because the entrance exam is strongly responsive to variations 
in students' endowed ability but only weakly responsive to parents' spending prior to the 
exam. Thus proposition 2 suggests that the educational planner can design the entrance 
exam in a way that it achieves a desired level of the relationship between a student's 
family background and educational outcome in a selective system. If such a design is 
difficult, if not impossible, in a selective system, a comprehensive system may offer an 
alternative level of such a relationship. 
In line with the theoretical predictions, empirical studies find conflicting evidence 
on effects of family background on educational outcomes under different school 
systems. Our model suggests that it is due to different designs of student allocation 
under a selective system. Using international data sets, Shuetz et al. (2005) find that a 
selective (comprehensive) system reinforces (weakens) the impact of family 
background on educational outcomes. Similar findings are reported by Bauer and 
Riphahn (2006) for Switzerland, Dustmann (2004) for Germany, Meghir and Palme   12
(2005) for Sweden and Pekkarinen et al. (2006) for Finland. In contrast, Galindo-Rueda 
and Vignoles (2005) show the role of parental background increased with the transition 
from a selective to a comprehensive system in the U.K. Waldinger (2006) and Brunello 
and Checchi (2006), however, find no evidence that family background has differential 
effects across comprehensive and selective systems, using international data sets. 
 
Proposition 3: (Inequality of the Educational Outcome: Variance of  A ln ) 
(i)  Suppose that  0 ) ln , (ln > y b Cov , as is often empirically found. If  3 2 δ δ ≤ , 
then the variance of  A ln   is larger in a selective system than in a 
comprehensive system. 
(ii) If  3 2 δ δ > , then the relative size of the variance of  A ln  is not determined 
uniformly between comprehensive and selective systems. It depends on 
parameter values,  ) (lnb Var ,  ) (ln y Var  and ) ln , (ln y b Cov . 
(iii) The variance of  A ln  in a selective system incrementally increases as  3 δ  
rises. It is minimized when  3 δ   is equal to zero. 
Proof: From (8), we can obtain the variance of  A ln  as  follows. 
[] []
2 *2
12 3 1 2 3 (ln ) (1 ) (ln ) ( ) (ln ) 2 (1 ) ( ) (ln ,ln ) Var A Var b Var y Cov b y δβ δ δ β γ δβ δ δ β γ =+ + + + + ⋅+ + +⋅
Assigning values of  1 δ ,  2 δ  and  3 δ   that characterize each system, respectively, we 
have  ) ln , (ln ) ( 2 ) (ln ) ( ) (ln ) (ln 2
2
2
* y b Cov y Var b Var A Var c ⋅ + + + + = γ β δ γ β δ  and 





* y b Cov y Var b Var A Var s ⋅ + + + + + + = γ β δ β δ γ β δ β δ . 
If  3 2 δ δ ≤ ,  ) (ln ) (ln
* *
s c A Var A Var < . If  3 2 δ δ > , however, either  ) (ln ) (ln
* *
s c A Var A Var <  
or  ) (ln ) (ln
* *
s c A Var A Var >   mainly due to the presence of  1 δ  in  ) (ln
*
s A Var . 





> + + + =
∂
∂
y b Cov y Var
A Var s β δ γ β δ β
δ
 and 









A Var s β
δ
 for  all  0 3 ≥ δ .  ) (ln
*
s A Var   is minimized at  0 3 = δ . 
QED 
 
In contrast to the conventional belief, the inequality of the educational outcome, 
which is measured by the variance of  A ln  in our model, is not necessarily larger in a 
selective system than in a comprehensive system. A comprehensive system allows the 
inequality of the educational outcome to depend on existing family income inequality 
(i.e., ) (ln y Var )  and the correlation between family income and the child's ability 
(i.e., ) ln , (ln y b Cov ) without guard. In contrast, by setting  3 δ  sufficiently low, a   13
selective system can reduce contributions of both to the inequality of the educational 
outcome and achieve a variance of  A ln  below the level offered by a comprehensive 
system. If  3 δ  rises beyond a threshold, however, the inequality of the educational 
outcome can worsen rapidly, as opponents of selective systems warn, because  
) (ln
*
s A Var   incrementally increases over  3 δ . 
Using the equations in the proof of proposition 3, we can draw the trajectory of 
) (ln ) (ln
* *
c s A Var A Var −  as  3 δ   changes. It is shown in Figure 1.   
 
<Insert Figure 1 here.> 
 
In order to determine the value of  ) (ln ) (ln
* *
c s A Var A Var −  for a given  3 δ , the 
location of the intercept matters, because  ) (ln ) (ln
* *
c s A Var A Var −  is an incrementally 
increasing function of  3 δ  for  all  0 3 ≥ δ . The intercept is given by   
)]] ln , (ln 2 ) (ln ) 2 [( )] ln , (ln ) (ln [ 2 ) (ln [ 2 2 1
2
1 y b Cov y Var y b Cov b Var b Var + + − + + γ β δ δ γ δ β δ β
. This is equal to or above zero if  1 1 ˆ δ δ ≥  and below zero if  1 1 ˆ δ δ <  where  1 ˆ δ  sets 
the intercept equal to zero,  ( ) 1 ˆ (ln ) (ln ,ln ) / (ln ) D Var b Cov b y Var b δγ β =− −  and 
) ln , (ln ) (ln ) ( 2 )] ln , (ln [ )] (ln [ 2
2 2 2 y b Cov b Var y b Cov b Var D γ β δ γ + + + ≡  
) (ln ) (ln ) 2 ( 2 2 y Var b Var ⋅ ⋅ + + γ β δ β δ . 
In summary, if  32 δ δ ≥ ,  then  ) (ln ) (ln
* *
c s A Var A Var > .  If  2 3 δ δ < , however, 
different scenarios exist:  ) (ln ) (ln
* *
c s A Var A Var ≥  for  all  0 3 ≥ δ  if  1 1 ˆ δ δ ≥ . If 
1 1 ˆ δ δ < , on the other hand,  ) (ln ) (ln
* *
c s A Var A Var ≥  for  3 3 ˆ δ δ ≥  and 
) (ln ) (ln
* *
c s A Var A Var <  for  3 3 ˆ δ δ < , where  3 ˆ δ , the threshold, equates  ) (ln
*
s A Var  
with  ) (ln
*
c A Var . 
  Taken as a whole, proposition 3 shows that the ranking of inequality of the 
educational outcome between comprehensive and selective systems is not uniformly   14
determined. It does not only depend on parameter values,  ) (lnb Var ,  ) (ln y Var  and 
) ln , (ln y b Cov , but on the design of a selective system. Unlike the conventional belief, 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict the change in overall inequality of educational 
outcomes between comprehensive and selective systems, unless detail information is 
available. Provided that enough information can be obtained, however, the educational 
planner may design a selective system in a way that it yields lower inequality in 
educational outcomes than can be achieved by an alternative comprehensive system. 
In line with the theoretical predictions, empirical studies find different directions of 
change in inequality of educational outcomes from an introduction of a new school 
system, probably due to different parameter values and selective designs,  ) (lnb Var , 
) (ln y Var  and ) ln , (ln y b Cov  of an education system under examination.  Using 
international data sets, Gorard and Smith (2004) and Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) 
find that a selective system exacerbates the inequality in educational outcomes. In a 
study on ability tracking in the U.S., however, Figlio and Page (2002) show tracking 
helps low-ability students and reduces the inequality of academic performance. 
 
Proposition 4: (Level of the Educational Outcome: Size of  A ln ) 






A ) is not determined 
uniformly between comprehensive and selective systems. It depends on 






A  increases 
(decreases) as  f p   rises (falls) relative to  d p .
8 






A  is negatively related to the child's ability (b ). In 






A  and family income ( y ) differs by 
the value of  3 δ . If  3 2 δ δ > , it is positively related to  y ; if  3 2 δ δ < , it is 
negatively related to  y ; if  3 2 δ δ = , it is independent of  y . 
Proof: From (8), 
*
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) do not change qualitative results.   15
the equation, the propositions can be obtained. QED 
 
Proposition 4(i) suggests that it is difficult a priori to decide which system yields 
higher educational outcomes. This is in contrast to previous studies that usually support 
a selective system as an efficient method of student allocation to schools (e.g., 
Fernandez and Gali, 1999; Lazear, 2001). These studies ignore a possibility that parents 
may exercise choices about grouping methods per se and a pool of students to be 
grouped may be subject to change when different grouping methods are adopted by 
different schools. Our model addresses such a possibility via prices ( d p  and  f p ). 
Because sorting of students into schools varies by the design, the ranking of the ultimate 
educational outcome mediated through peer effects is indeterminate between 
comprehensive and selective systems. We can only infer that given the design of a 
selective system (i.e, given  1 δ  and  3 δ ), parents in general prefer a selective 
(comprehensive) system as  d p   rises (falls) relative to  f p . 
Rare empirical studies report inconclusive evidence on the impact of school systems 
on overall educational outcomes. While Kang et al. (forthcoming) show that a transition 
from a selective to a comprehensive system in secondary education significantly 
increased the average educational outcome (i.e., adulthood earnings) in South Korea, 
Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) find that school systems fail to yield significant 
differences in the average outcome (i.e., test score in secondary school), using 
international data sets. 
Proposition 4(ii) implies that households with different characteristics ( y b, ) prefer 
different systems, depending on the design of a selective system. To illustrate this, let us 
draw a line of ( y b, ) combinations that equates 
*
c A  with 
*
s A , and identify which 
household prefers which system. Such a line is expressed by   
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C   and displayed in Figure 2. 
 
<Insert Figure 2 here.> 
 
Depending on values of  3 δ , there are three different types of the lines that equate 
*
c A  with 
*
s A . If  3 2 δ δ > , the line is an upward-sloping curve; if  3 2 δ δ = , the line is a   16
vertical straight line; if  3 2 δ δ < , the line is a downward-sloping curve. The preference 
ordering between comprehensive and selective systems varies according to the value of 
3 δ  relative  to  2 δ . 
In the first case where  3 2 δ δ > , given a child's ability, high-income (low-income) 
parents prefer a comprehensive (selective) system, because by purchasing a school 
district (d ) as opposed to investing in an entrance exam ( f ), parents can more easily 
manipulate the quality of school peers in a comprehensive system than in a selective 
system. Alternatively, given a family income, high-ability (low-ability) students prefer a 
selective (comprehensive) system, because a student's ability serves to enhance the 
quality of school peers in a selective system but does not in a comprehensive system. 
In the second case where  3 2 δ δ = , given a family income, high-ability (low-ability) 
students prefer a selective (comprehensive) system for the same reason as above. In this 
case, a student's ability alone, but not family income, contributes to the preference 
ordering between the two systems. Since the elasticities of  A with respect to  d  and 
f   are the same, family income equally functions to improve the quality of school peers 
both in comprehensive and selective systems. 
In the third case where  3 2 δ δ < , it is same as in the previous two cases that given a 
family income, high-ability (low-ability) students prefer a selective (comprehensive) 
system. Unlike the previous cases, however, given a child's ability, high-income (low-
income) parents prefer a selective (comprehensive) system, because income can be 
more effectively spent for investing in the entrance exam ( f ) than for purchasing a 
school district (d ) due to a strong responsiveness of the exam to  f . 
In sum, proposition 4 suggests that the educational planner may design a selective 
system by means of the entrance exam in a way that parents value a selective system 
more or less than a comprehensive system. Depending on different designs of a 
selective system, each household can have different preference orderings for 
comprehensive and selective systems. Which design of a selective system is offered will 
ultimately depend on the objectives of education (e.g., efficiency and/or equity of 
education) that a society would like to achieve. 
 
5. A Household's Choice in a Market System  
 
As a third alternative of student allocation to schools, we consider a market system in 
which parents can purchase the quality of school peers (θ ) at a given price ( θ p ) 
charged by the perfectly competitive private school. Market systems are also analyzed 
by Epple and Romano (1998) and Fernandez and Gali (1999).   17
      Under the market system, a parent maximizes the utility  ) (
γ β α θ e b x u =  subject  to 
a budget constraint  e y xp p e θθ =+ + . There is no tax in this system ( 0 = t ), because 
only private schools exist. 
The optimal quantity of each type of consumption and indirect utility function can 
be obtained as follows. With subscript  m   for a market system, 
y xm α =

































* ,         ( 1 3 )  
* * * ) ( m m m A x u
α = ,           ( 1 4 )  
 
Note, from equation (11), that if  θ p  is negatively related to a student's ability (b ) 
in the form of scholarships and fellowships, a school of a given quality is attended by 
students whose family income is high but ability is low, and those whose family income 
is low but ability is high. See Epple and Romano (1998) and Epple et al. (2002) for the 
same finding. 
 







































































(ii) Given that  1 2 = δ   in a comprehensive system,  ) (ln ) (ln
* *
c m A Var A Var = . 
(iii) If  1 3 ≥ δ ,  ) (ln ) (ln
* *
s m A Var A Var < ; if  1 3 < δ , however, either   
) (ln ) (ln
* *
s m A Var A Var >  or  ) (ln ) (ln
* *
s m A Var A Var < . The inequality depends on 
parameter values,  ) (lnb Var ,  ) (ln y Var  and ) ln , (ln y b Cov . 






A  is either positive or negative, depending on parameter values, a tax   18






A  increases (decreases) 
as  θ p  rises (falls) relative to  d p . Given that  1 2 = δ  in a comprehensive 






A  is  independent  of b  or  y .
9 






A  is either positive or negative, depending on parameter values, a tax 
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A  is 
positively related to  y  if  1 3 > δ ; negatively related to  y  if  1 3 < δ ; and 
independent of  y  if  1 3 = δ . 












A   are negatively related with the tax rate  t. 










































. A comparison with results in the proof of 
proposition 2 reveals proposition 5(i); The variances of 
* ln m A , 
* ln c A  and 
* ln s A  are 
*2 (ln ) (ln ) ( ) (ln ) 2( ) (ln ,ln ) m Var A Var b Var y Cov b y βγ βγ =+ + + + ⋅  and 
) ln , (ln ) ( 2 ) (ln ) ( ) (ln ) (ln 2
2
2
* y b Cov y Var b Var A Var c ⋅ + + + + = γ β δ γ β δ  and  





* y b Cov y Var b Var A Var s ⋅ + + + + + + = γ β δ β δ γ β δ β δ . 
Thus, if  1 2 = δ ,  ) (ln ) (ln
* *
m c A Var A Var = , which shows proposition 5(ii); From the 
preceding equations, if  1 3 ≥ δ ,  ) (ln ) (ln
* *
m s A Var A Var > . If  1 3 < δ , however, 
)) ln , (ln ) 1 ( ) (ln ( 2 [ ) (ln ) (ln 1 3
2
3
* * y b Cov y Var A Var A Var m s β δ γ δ β δ β + + + = −  
)] ln , (ln 2 ) (ln ) 2 ( )] ln , (ln ) (ln [ 2 ) (ln 1
2
1 y b Cov y Var y b Cov b Var b Var − + − + + + γ β γ δ β δ . 
Thus, either  ) (ln ) (ln
* *
m s A Var A Var <  or  ) (ln ) (ln
* *
m s A Var A Var >  mainly due to the 
presence of  1 δ  in  ) (ln
*
s A Var . This shows proposition 5(iii); 
                                            














) do not change qualitative results.   19




c p p t y
A
A
δ β β δ δ β γ β δ β δ θ − + − + − + + ⋅ − =
)] ln( ) [ln( ) 1 ln( ) ( ) ln( ) ( 2 2 d p p t − + − + = + + + − θ β γ β γ β δ α γ β δ  given  1 2 = δ , 






s − + + ⋅ − + ⋅ = γ β δ β δ β δ   
) ln( ) ( )] ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( [ 3 3 3 3 3 γ β δ α γ β δ δ β β δ δ β θ + + + − − + − + f p p . 
Propositions 5(iv), (v) and (vi) are trivial. QED 
 
Propositions 5(i) and 5(ii) suggest that once a market system is introduced, a 
comprehensive system is reduced to a market system as far as the elasticity of  A with 
respect to  b  and  y , and the variance of  A ln  are concerned. If parents can purchase 
the child's peers in school (θ ) directly at price  θ p , they do not need to purchase  d  at 
the school district level and pay taxes. According to proposition 5(iv), however, the 
ranking of  A ln  is not determined uniformly between comprehensive and market 
systems due to the presence of prices in the ranking. 
   Proposition 5(iii) indicates that it is difficult to predict the ranking of inequality in 
the educational outcome between selective and market systems. Using the equation in 
the proof, we can draw the trajectory of  ) (ln ) (ln
* *
m s A Var A Var −  over  3 δ , which is 
shown in Figure 3. 
 
<Insert Figure 3 here.> 
 
In order to determine the value of  ) (ln ) (ln
* *
m s A Var A Var −  for a given  3 δ , the 
location of the intercept matters, because  ) (ln
*
s A Var  is an incrementally increasing 
function of  3 δ  for  all  0 3 ≥ δ , as shown in proposition 3. The intercept is given by   
)] ln , (ln 2 ) (ln ) 2 ( )] ln , (ln ) (ln [ 2 ) (ln [ 1
2
1 y b Cov y Var y b Cov b Var b Var − + − + + γ β γ δ β δ β .  
This is equal to or above zero if 
*
1 1 δ δ ≥  and below zero if 
*
1 1 δ δ <  where 
*
1 δ  sets 
the intercept equal to zero,  ()
*
1 (ln ) (ln ,ln ) / (ln ) D Var b Cov b y Var b δγ β ′ =− −  and  
) ln , (ln ) (ln ) ( 2 )] ln , (ln [ )] (ln [
2 2 2 y b Cov b Var y b Cov b Var D γ β γ + + + ≡ ′  
) (ln ) (ln ) 2 ( y Var b Var ⋅ ⋅ + + γ β β .   20
In summary, if  1 3 ≥ δ ,  ) (ln ) (ln
* *
m s A Var A Var > . If  1 3 < δ , however, different 
scenarios exist:  ) (ln ) (ln
* *
m s A Var A Var ≥  for all  0 3 ≥ δ  if 
*
1 1 δ δ ≥ ; if 
*
1 1 δ δ < , on the 
other hand,  ) (ln ) (ln
* *
m s A Var A Var ≥  for 
*
3 3 δ δ ≥  and  ) (ln ) (ln
* *
m s A Var A Var <  for 
*
3 3 δ δ < , where 
*
3 δ  equates  ) (ln
*
s A Var  and  ) (ln
*
m A Var . Thus, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to predict the change in overall inequality of the educational outcome 
between selective and market systems, unless detail information is available. 
Proposition 5(iv) implies that a household's preference ordering between 
comprehensive and market systems does not depend on its characteristics ( y b, ). Every 
household likes either a comprehensive system or a market system. The ranking is 
determined solely by parameter values, a tax rate (t) and prices. 
In contrast, the preference ordering between selective and market systems depends 
on a household's characteristics ( y b, ) according to proposition 5(v). Households with 
different characteristics ( y b, ) prefer different systems, depending on the design of a 
selective system. To illustrate this, let us draw a line of ( y b, ) combinations that equate 
*
s A  with 
*
m A , and identify which household prefers which system in Figure 4. Such a 
line is expressed by 
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<Insert Figure 4 here.> 
 
As earlier, depending on the values of  3 δ , there are three different types of the lines 
that equate 
*
s A  with 
*
m A . If  1 3 < δ , the line is an upward-sloping curve; if  1 3 = δ , the 
line is a vertical straight line; if  1 3 > δ , the line is a downward-sloping curve.   
If 1 3 < δ , given a child's ability, high-income (low-income) parents prefer a market 
(selective) system, because by purchasing school peers (θ ) directly as opposed to 
investing in an entrance exam ( f ), parents can more easily manipulate the quality of 
school peers in a market system than in a selective system. Alternatively, given a family 
income, high-ability (low-ability) students prefer a selective (market) system, because a 
student's ability serves to enhance the quality of school peers in a selective system but 
does not in a market system.   21
If 1 3 = δ , a student's ability alone, but not family income, contribute to the 
preference ordering between market and selective systems, because family income 
equally functions to improve the quality of school peers both in market and selective 
systems. Given a family income, high-ability (low-ability) students prefer a selective 
(market) system.   
If 1 3 > δ , it is same as in the previous two cases that given a family income, high-
ability (low-ability) students prefer a selective (market) system. Unlike the previous 
cases, however, given a child's ability, high-income (low-income) parents prefer a 
selective (market) system, because income can be more effectively spent for investing 
in the entrance exam ( f ) than for purchasing school peers (θ ) due to a strong 
responsiveness of the exam to  f . In sum, depending on different designs of a selective 
system, each household can have different preference orderings for selective and market 
systems. As in the comparison between comprehensive and selective systems, which 
design of a selective system is offered will depend on the objectives of education that a 
society would like to achieve. 
Proposition 5(vi) indicates that parents in general do not like high tax rates. If a tax 
rate is lower than a threshold, however, they like rationing systems better than a market 
system. Thus, by making public schools more efficient and reducing the amount of taxes 
required for an operation of them, the educational planner can induce parents to prefer 
rationing systems to a market system. 
 
Proposition 6: (Educational Expenditures in Market and Rationing Systems) 
(i)  Given that  1 2 = δ  in a comprehensive system,  c m E E <  where  j E  denotes 
total educational expenditures of a household in system  ) , , ( m s c j = . 
(ii) If 1 3 ≥ δ , then  s m E E < ; if  1 3 < δ , however, there are two cases. When 
β δ ) 1 ( 3 − ≥ t ,  s m E E ≤ ; when  β δ ) 1 ( 3 − < t ,  s m E E > . 
 
Proof: From equations (5), (6), (7), (11) and (12), a household's total expenditures on 
education are  y
t








= + + ≡
γ β δ α
γ β δ α
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2 * * in a comprehensive system, 
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t








= + + ≡
γ β δ α
γ β δ α
3
3 * *   in a selective system, and     
y e p p E m e m m ) 1 (
* * α θ θ − = + ≡   in a market system.  ty E E m c = −  and   22
] ) 1 ( [ 3
3
β δ






E E m s . Given the equations, propositions (i) and (ii) are 
trivial. QED 
 
Since a comprehensive system is reduced to a market system once a market system 
is introduced, each household spends more exactly by the tax payment in a 
comprehensive system than in a market system. When a selective system is compared 
with a market system, however, total educational expenditures depend on the design of a 
selective system and a tax rate. With high tax rates above (below) a threshold, each 
household spends more (less) in a selective system than in a market system. 
In combination with proposition 1, we infer that if  1 3 ≥ δ ,  s c m E E E ≤ < ; if  1 3 < δ , 
c E  is the largest but the ranking between  m E  and  s E  depends on the tax rate: if 
β δ ) 1 ( 3 − < t ,  c m s E E E < < , but if  β δ ) 1 ( 3 − ≥ t ,  c s m E E E < ≤ . An implication of 
such findings is that excessive educational spending as observed in East Asian countries 
is closely related to its comprehensive systems of student allocation. If excessive 
educational spending is an important problem of an educational system, then either a 
selective or market system may serve as an alternative to a comprehensive system.   
 
6. A Policy Experiment: A School System with Double Subsystems 
 
An implication of the finding that households with different characteristics (i.e.,  b  and 
y ) prefer different systems is that by offering multiple subsystems within a school 
system and giving households a choice between them, the educational planner can 
enhance educational attainments as well as welfare of households beyond those that can 
be achieved by a single national system. For example, if a country adopts a national 
selective system in which students take an entrance exam and compete to enter a better 
school nationwide, our theory suggests that some households prefer such a system, 
while other households like an alternative comprehensive system; which household 
prefers which system depends on the design of the entrance exam in the selective 
system. In contrast to such a case, if the two subsystems are offered in two separate 
regions of a nation's education system, households with different sets of ( y b, ) sort (in 
consideration of moving costs) into the one that serves better to their needs, and the 
average educational attainment of students will rise. 
Although double subsystems in a nation offer efficiency gains, how the equity of 
education that concerns the elasticities of  A   with respect to b  and  y  and 
) (ln A Var  will be affected is not clear; the measures are nonlinearly (via weighted   23
averages) dependent on parameters,  ) (lnb Var ,  ) (ln y Var  and ) ln , (ln y b Cov  under 
the double subsystems. To evaluate consequences of the introduction of double 
subsystems into a national education system, we employ a simulation method as 
follows: Given a distribution of ( y b, ), we experiment with a system that has a 
comprehensive design in one region and a selective design in the other.
10  In this system, 
a student is subject to a comprehensive subsystem if she resides at the comprehensive 
region and to a selective subsystem if she resides at the selective region. A household 
must choose either region before the child enters a school in order to send her to the 
preferred school. Until relevant discussions are made later, we assume in the simulation 
that there is no cost of a household's moving between the two regions prior to the 
entrance to a school. We also suppose that there is no capacity constraint of schools: all 
students attend a school if they are qualified. 
One thousand different sets of ( y b, ) are generated by drawing random numbers 
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Following Epple and Romano (1998), we set  ) ln , (ln y b Cov   equal to 0.4. We assign 
0.3 to  β , since peer effects literature reports the range of the effect of average peer 
quality on a student's achievement between 0.2 and 0.4 for elementary and secondary 
school students (Hanushek et al., 2003; Hoxby, 2000; Kang, 2007). To  γ  we allocate 
0.2, because Card and Krueger (1996, p.37) summarize that a 10 percent increase in 
public school spending lead to about a 1-2 percent increase in subsequent earnings. 
Thus  α  is equal to 0.5 in the simulation.
11 We set all of  d p ,  f p  and  e p  equal to 
one, as we have no useful information on them and wish to avoid arbitrary price 
differences.
12 We  set  05 . 0 = t . 
                                            
10 We do not consider a market system in the simulation, because once a tax rate is given, comparisons 
are straightforward. 
11 Different values of  α ,  β  and γ  in plausible ranges proposed in the text do not yield qualitative 
differences in simulation results. 
12 Proposition  4(i) indicates that different prices of  d p  and  f p   yield different rankings between 
*
c A  
and 
*
s A , while they do not affect other criteria of the comparison. Nevertheless, different prices do not 
change the finding that double subsystems outperform a single national system, since households will at   24
Simulation results based on different combinations of  1 δ  and  3 δ   ( g i v e n   1 2 = δ ) 
are shown in Table 1. In the table,  ) Pr(
* *
s c A A <  denotes the proportion of students 













∂   are OLS estimates of  1 τ  and  2 τ , 
respectively, of an econometric model ( ε τ τ τ + + + = y b A ln ln ln 2 1 0 ) that uses the 
simulated data.  ) (ln A Var  and  ) (A Mean   are calculated based on the simulated sample. 
 
<Insert Table 1 here.> 
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∂  rises with  3 δ .  ) (ln
*
c A Var  does not vary over  1 δ  and  3 δ , but  ) (ln
*
s A Var  
incrementally increases with  3 δ . While  ) (ln ) (ln
* *
c s A Var A Var >  for all  0 3 > δ  if  1 δ  
is either 0.75 or 1, the inequality reverses below a certain value of  3 δ  if  1 δ  is either 
0.25 or 0.5.  ) (
*
s A Mean  changes  over  1 δ  and  3 δ  but  ) (
*
c A Mean   is constant over both. 
The proportion of households that prefer a selective system to a comprehensive system 
falls with  3 δ   for a given  1 δ . 
If the two subsystems are offered in two separate regions of a nation, households 
freely (due to no moving cost) move between them to send the child to the preferred 
school. According to the first row of each panel of Table 1, the proportion of households 
that send the child to a selective system falls with  3 δ   for a given  1 δ . In a system with 
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∂  are in the middle of the respective values of the comprehensive 
                                                                                                                                
any rate sort into the preferred subsystem.   25
and selective designs, because the values of double subsystems are the weighted 
averages of those of single comprehensive and selective systems. For given values of 
1 δ  and  3 δ ,  ) (ln
*
d A Var  is also intermediate between  ) (ln
*
c A Var  and  ) (ln
*
s A Var . 
According to the simulation results, if  1 δ   is either 0.25 or 0.5, then  ) (ln
*
d A Var  can  be 
lower at certain levels of  3 δ  than  ) (ln
*
c A Var , which can be achieved by a national 
comprehensive system. For such values of  1 δ  and  3 δ ,  ) (ln
*
s A Var  is smaller than 
) (ln
*
c A Var   because family income minimally functions to enhance a child's peer quality. 
As motivated earlier, in terms of the average educational outcome, the system with 
double subsystems outperforms the two single national systems, because households 
can choose the most efficient system for them. 
If we introduce a fixed cost (T ) of moving between comprehensive and selective 
regions into the model, baseline results presented above largely hold. A major difference 
is that the moving costs prevent low-income households from moving to the preferred 
subsystem. In Figure 2 these households are represented by combinations of ( y b, ) 
below a dotted horizontal line at  T y = . In addition, the slope of the line of ( y b, ) 
combinations that equate 
*
c A  with 
*
s A  changes in response to positive moving costs. 
In the presence of moving costs, efficiency gains from double subsystems will be 
smaller than those in the case of no moving cost. Nevertheless, a system with double 
subsystems outperforms two single systems, unless T  is exceptionally high. It also 
achieves an intermediate level of equity between single comprehensive and single 
selective systems. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, we examine the impacts of different systems of student allocation on 
efficiency and equity of education. First, we argue that how a selective system is 
designed matters a great deal in a comparison between comprehensive and selective 
systems. If a selective system is based on an entrance exam to assign students to schools, 
whether the exam signals a student's innate ability or ability affected by parents' 
educational spending (prior to the exam) yields different educational implications. 
Unlike the conventional belief, the effect of family income on educational outcomes can 
be stronger in a comprehensive system than in a selective system, if the latter is based 
on an entrance exam biased toward innate ability. In addition, the educational planner 
may design an entrance exam in a selective system in a way that it yields lower 
inequality in educational attainment than a comprehensive system offers. A judicious   26
use of a selective system can at times achieve educational goals better than a 
comprehensive system. 
Second, the paper also finds that once introduced, a market system would dominate 
a comprehensive system under certain conditions, and the former can be compared with 
a selective system. It is notable that a household's total educational expenditures are 
lowest under a market system whether an entrance exam under a selective system is 
biased toward either acquired or innate abilities, if the tax rate in rationing systems is 
sufficiently high. The ranking of the educational outcome, however, is not uniformly 
determined across the three systems.   
Third, given that households with different characteristics (i.e.,  b  and  y ) prefer 
different systems, a school system with double subsystems (e.g., comprehensive in one 
region and selective in the other) outperforms a single national system in terms of 
efficiency. It achieves an intermediate level of equity between single comprehensive and 
single selective systems. 
Although useful policy implications can be drawn from our approach, it is not, of 
course, free of drawbacks. First, the model is based on partial equilibrium, where prices 
are fixed across different school systems. In the context of general equilibrium, however, 
the prices vary by the structure of markets. We do not model the changes in markets for 
d ,  f  and e  in response to those in demand for each in different school systems. This 
would give us a new agenda for a further study. 
Second, our education production is based on a Cobb-Douglas form, where peer-
effects increase with a student's ability (i.e., 
γ β θ e b A = ). Such a form of peer effects 
are frequently used in economic theories of education (e.g., Fernandez and Gali, 1999; 
Lazear, 2001). Without concerns for prices, they usually find ability matching between a 
student and peers as an efficient method of student allocation to schools. As Lazear 
(2001) and Benabou (1996) point out, however, if high-ability students can more 
strongly affect low-ability students through interactions than vice versa, ability mixing 
in school and classroom yields more efficient outcomes. By assuming a Cobb-Douglas 
form, we avoid complications that may be introduced by different functional forms of 
educational production. Nevertheless, there is a need to employ different specifications 
of peer effects over ability in educational production for future research.   27
Appendix: Two alternatives for the consumer's preferences 
 
(1) CES utility between x and A 




ρρ ρ =+  with  Abe
β γ θ =  and  
3 2 1 δ δ δ θ f d b = , ( 1 , 0 < < γ β , 1 ≤ ρ ). 
The strategy for utility maximization is as follows. We choose the optimal x and A first 
and then choose the optimal θ and e by maximizing the sub-function of A. The results 


























































δβ δβ γ δ δ β γ
δ β δβ δβ γ
δδ β γ
++
+ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤ −
=⋅ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ++ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦ ⎝⎠
  
1
** [] ux A























































+ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
= ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
,  ()
1
** * [( ) ] mm m ux A











The optimal choices are very similar to our original results in the text. One exception is 
the consumption on private goods. The expenditure on the private goods remains the 
same between comprehensive and selective systems.   
 
(2) CES function between θ and e   28
Consider a following utility function of a household that consists of a parent and one 
child; 
ux A
α =  with 
1
[] A be
ρρ ρ θ =+ and 
3 2 1 δ δ δ θ f d b = , ( 1 , , 0 < < γ β α , 1 ≤ ρ ). 
The strategy for utility maximization is as follows. We choose the optimal x and A first 
and then choose the optimal θ and e by maximizing the sub-function of A. The results 
are summarized as follows. 
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Except in a special case of  0 3 = δ , the functional form of the educational outcome ( A) 
fails to be determined. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to draw clear differences 
in educational implications across school systems, given the current functional forms of 
utility and educational production.  29
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Table 1: Simulation Results 
 
  25 . 0 1 = δ  
3 δ   0  0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 
) Pr(
* *






∂           
Comprehensive 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Selective 1.075 1.075 1.075 1.075 1.075 1.075 1.075 1.075 






∂           
Comprehensive 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
Selective 0.200 0.260 0.320 0.380 0.440 0.500 0.560 0.620 
Double Subsystems 0.217 0.285 0.344 0.400 0.455 0.500 0.521 0.537 
) (ln A Var           
Comprehensive 1.699 1.699 1.699 1.699 1.699 1.699 1.699 1.699 
Selective 1.407 1.489 1.579 1.675 1.779 1.779 2.009 2.135 
Double Subsystems 1.423 1.510 1.594 1.679 1.757 1.757 1.802 1.825 
) (A Mean           
Comprehensive 1.083 1.083 1.083 1.083 1.083 1.083 1.083 1.083 
Selective 1.484 1.297 1.226 1.193 1.181 1.184 1.201 1.229 
Double Subsystems 1.514 1.334 1.256 1.209 1.186 1.189 1.213 1.252 
  5 . 0 1 = δ  
3 δ   0  0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 
) Pr(
* *






∂           
Comprehensive 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Selective 1.150 1.150 1.150 1.150 1.150 1.150 1.150 1.150 






∂           
Comprehensive 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
Selective 0.200 0.260 0.320 0.380 0.440 0.500 0.560 0.620 
Double Subsystems 0.216 0.286 0.348 0.408 0.462 0.500 0.524 0.542 
) (ln A Var           
Comprehensive 1.699 1.699 1.699 1.699 1.699 1.699 1.699 1.699 
Selective 1.591 1.677 1.770 1.870 1.978 2.093 2.216 2.345 
Double Subsystems 1.597 1.678 1.757 1.825 1.873 1.887 1.897 1.915 
) (A Mean           
Comprehensive 1.083 1.083 1.083 1.083 1.083 1.083 1.083 1.083 
Selective 1.619 1.417 1.342 1.307 1.296 1.302 1.322 1.354 
Double Subsystems 1.636 1.437 1.356 1.316 1.302 1.310 1.336 1.377   35
Table 1: Simulation Results (Continued) 
 
  75 . 0 1 = δ  
3 δ   0  0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 
) Pr(
* *






∂           
Comprehensive 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Selective 1.225 1.225 1.225 1.225 1.225 1.225 1.225 1.225 






∂           
Comprehensive 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
Selective 0.200 0.260 0.320 0.380 0.440 0.500 0.560 0.620 
Double Subsystems 0.218 0.292 0.357 0.416 0.465 0.500 0.525 0.546 
) (ln A Var           
Comprehensive 1.699 1.699 1.699 1.699 1.699 1.699 1.699 1.699 
Selective 1.787 1.876 1.973 2.077 2.189 2.307 2.434 2.567 
Double Subsystems 1.779 1.848 1.906 1.952 1.979 1.987 1.996 2.013 
) (A Mean           
Comprehensive 1.083 1.083 1.083 1.083 1.083 1.083 1.083 1.083 
Selective 1.775 1.555 1.475 1.439 1.429 1.438 1.462 1.500 
Double Subsystems 1.784 1.568 1.486 1.448 1.439 1.450 1.479 1.524 
  0 . 1 1 = δ  
3 δ   0  0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 
) Pr(
* *






∂           
Comprehensive 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Selective 1.300 1.300 1.300 1.300 1.300 1.300 1.300 1.300 






∂           
Comprehensive 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
Selective 0.200 0.260 0.320 0.380 0.440 0.500 0.560 0.620 
Double Subsystems 0.225 0.302 0.367 0.423 0.467 0.500 0.526 0.548 
) (ln A Var           
Comprehensive 1.699 1.699 1.699 1.699 1.699 1.699 1.699 1.699 
Selective 1.994 2.087 2.188 2.295 2.411 2.533 2.663 2.800 
Double Subsystems 1.964 2.006 2.042 2.072 2.084 2.091 2.100 2.116 
) (A Mean           
Comprehensive 1.083 1.083 1.083 1.083 1.083 1.083 1.083 1.083 
Selective 1.956 1.716 1.630 1.592 1.584 1.596 1.625 1.670 
Double Subsystems 1.963 1.727 1.640 1.604 1.597 1.612 1.645 1.695 
 